As I continue to read analyses on Boko Haram, the more disenchanted I become with existing counter-terrorism scholarship. Often what passes as analysis is superficial: attempting to get to grips with who the new leadership is, where they get their arms from, and their possible links to Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb and Al Shabab. Whilst these are legitimate concerns, what is problematic is that the wider-context in which counter-terrorism policy is formulated is ignored.

We ignore the fact that movements like Boko Haram can tap into a proud history of jihad beginning with that of Usman dan Fodio in 1804 which resulted in the creation of the Sokoto caliphate under Fulani emirs. As with Boko Haram, Usman dan Fodio’s jihad was ostensibly also focused on purifying Islam. This notion of purifying Islam was witnessed in the attacks in 1908 of the Kanawa against the residence of the British Resident in northern Nigeria on account of alcohol consumption on the premises. It was also seen in 2004 with the rise of the self-styled Nigerian Taliban who not only attacked police stations but also brothels and establishments where alcohol was sold.

Context matters in other ways too. British colonial rule until 1960 witnessed northern Nigeria being ruled differently from that of the south. Northern Nigeria remained largely autonomous under the control of chiefs and religious leaders. In the post-colonial period, we have a situation where two very different Nigerias – north and south – uneasily co-existing and where religious differences are reinforced by ethnic divisions and are further reinforced by regional divides.

Given the northern dominance of the armed forces, the return to civilian rule in 1999 and to rise to power of Olusegun Obasanjo, the first Christian from southern Nigeria to win democratic elections, has brought new insecurities in the north and a feeling that now both economic and political power resides in the south. This impression was reinforced with the election of another Christian southerner in the form of current president, Goodluck Jonathan. Boko Haram’s rise then must also be placed within the context of a sense of alienation and marginalisation in the north.

Context also matters when one considers that even before independence, we have seen the rise of violent sub-national identities often with religious overtones such as in Jos between the Hausa and Igbo in 1945, conflict in Kano between the Hausa and Igbo flared in 1952, 1960-1964 and again in 1966, the Tiv riots of 1962-1964 and the botched Biafran secession which led to the Nigeria civil war of 1967-1970. Since the 1990s religious and ethnic clashes have resurfaced in Plateau and Benue States – both states where Boko Haram has also been active. Indeed, the Nigerian state has proven incapable of getting its citizens to think of themselves as Nigerian first. Boko Haram has proven adept at playing into these differences – ethnic, regional and religious – causing further polarisation.

Unless counter-terrorism efforts focus on this broader context as well, we may well have a situation where Boko Haram is defeated and another Nigerian Taliban or Salafist formation replaces it since the objective conditions continue to exist for the rejuvenation of such radical movements.

 

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Following the success of the London conference on Somalia convened by British Prime Minister David Cameron, a vibrant debate ensued on whether or not the international community should engage with Al Shabab in peace talks. Bashi Do’oley, a member of the Somali diaspora in Canada stridently argued that, “The real solution is in allowing the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) to talk to Al Shabab. If the US is openly talking to the Taliban why not allow President Sheikh Sharif talk to his erstwhile allies?”

Appealing as this argument is, it is false. In the first instance, Washington’s outreach to the Taliban is not without preconditions. Amongst these are peace talks with a Taliban which distances itself from Al Qaeda. By contrast, in the days running up to the London conference, Al Shabab proudly announced its formal alliance to Ayman al Zawahiri’s Al Qaeda network. Following the announcement US Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton, was correct to rule out talks with Al Shabab declaring that, “it is not on the side of peace, stability of the Somali people”. In any event Al Shabab spokesperson, Ali Mohamud Rage, has rejected any peace talks with the TFG, neighbouring states or even other Somali factions.

Beyond these obvious difficulties engaging with Al Shabab in its current form, there are also specific problems for third party mediators. Does one engage with Al Shabab as a Somali organisation or as the local franchise of Al Qaeda? If the latter, it leaves little room to negotiate. If the former, how Somali is Al Shabab given its clan bias in its supporting constituency? Moreover, as with so many Islamist organisations, Al Shabab is clear on what it is against, but there is little in its programme on what it is for. For instance, what would an Al Shabab dominated government’s policy be towards economic policy or piracy, for that matter? Granted, they do want shar’iah law but how it is implemented can be interpreted in a variety of ways – from more liberal to more draconian. Given the Wahhabist inclinations of Al Shabab, it would pit its interpretations against the vast majority of Sufi Muslims in the country resulting in a further escalation of conflict. To emphasise the point, there is nothing in Al Shabab’s programme which suggests that it could be a partner for peace.

That being said, and given the internal tensions within Al Shabab between its more nationalist elements and its more Islamist radical elements, which is increasing as a result of the military and economic pressure put on the organisation, there could well be a scenario where peace negotiations could be conducted with these more nationalist elements. Hinting at such a possibility, Clinton did say that the international community would be ready to engage with anyone willing to renounce violence and embrace the peace process. Also hinting at such a possibility, Ethiopian Prime Minister Meles Zenawi stated that whilst there was “no room for compromise” with Al Shabab’s “hard core” members, there was presumably still room for engagement with the movements more pragmatic elements.

In the short term then, the military option has to be pursued against Al Shabab with increased vigour. At the same time, an olive branch needs to be extended to more pragmatic elements within the movement on the condition that they renounce Al Qaeda, renounce violence and engage in the political process where they will be one of many Somali actors attempting to stop the carnage and rebuild their country.

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Ali was excited. “Soon, I will be able to return home,” he exclaimed to me. This young man is a Somali refugee in South Africa who fled the violence in his country as a child with his parents. What triggered his excitement and the hope of return to his conflict-ridden country was a conference on Somalia convened in London by British Prime Minister David Cameron.

The conference was holistic in scope – bringing together 55 countries and organisations. It is hoped that this will lead to greater coordination between the different actors as they attempt to end the violence and rebuild the strife-torn country. Often, one hears of holistic counter-terrorism approaches, but in practice they are hard to come by. The London conference is different, in that it has military, political and humanitarian dimensions. Furthermore, it is adopting a longer-term perspective focusing on rebuilding the Somali state, as opposed to just responding to the terrorist threat posed by Al Shabab and its alliance with Al Qaeda.

On the military front, the United Nations Security Council approved the deployment of a further 5,700 African Union troops in Somalia. This would bring the AMISOM force to 17,700 and it is hoped that they would liberate more areas from Al Shabab control. On the political front, recognising the importance of a more inclusive government, the mandate of the TFG will expire in August paving the way for a more representative entity. This is crucial, given the clan-fractured nature of Somali society and polity.

On the humanitarian front, more aid was promised at the London conference with an emphasis on long-term needs as policy-makers consider not just the challenges of post-conflict reconstruction but also rebuilding a failed state. To this effect, 16 UN agencies are already working to alleviate the plight of Somalis. It is imperative to recognise that the provision of basic social services and the like is not only important to alleviate human suffering but also for the purposes of the consolidation of military gains through the acquisition of political legitimacy.

Whilst Al Shabab spokesman Ali Mohamud Rage denounced the London conference as another attempt to colonise Somalia – something which Al Shabab has pledged to resist, the fact is that Al Shabab is increasingly finding itself besieged by Ethiopian, Kenyan, Somali Transitional Federal Government (TFG) and the African Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) forces. Having been forced out of Mogadishu and its surroundings, Al Shabab last week also lost control over the key strategic town of Baidoa to Ethiopian and Somali troops. A naval blockade of Kismayo is on the cards in the coming weeks together with more aerial and land attacks on Al Shabab’s southern Somalia stronghold.

The ongoing military, diplomatic, political, and humanitarian surge might well represent Somalia’s best hope for peace. Perhaps Ali would have his wish and return to the country of his birth.

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“Today, I have glad tidings for the Muslim ummah [nation] that will please the believers and disturb the disbelievers, which is the joining of the Shabaab al-Mujahideen Movement in Somalia to Qaeda al-Jihad to support the unity against the Zionist-Crusader campaign and their assistants amongst the treacherous agent rulers”. These were the words uttered by al-Qaeda chief Ayman al-Zawahiri in a recent video announcing the formal joining of Somalia’s Al Shabaab movement to the al-Qaeda network.

What was interesting was what the reaction to this supposedly dramatic announcement. One US policy maker, when asked for his comment, simply shrugged his shoulders and stated that there was nothing new in the announcement – that it simply confirmed what was widely known. Indeed al-Shabaab had already issued a bayat [oath of allegiance] to former al-Qaeda head Osama bin Laden in 2009. The announcement by Zawahiri must then be read as an attempt to provide a morale boost to his comrades-in-arms. After all, al-Qaeda’s leadership has suffered serious losses in US predator drone strikes as well as the fact that funds and new recruits have been drying up. More importantly, since 2005 al-Qaeda has failed to carry out a major attack on the West. The announcement then must be seen as an opportunistic and desperate attempt for some media coverage and relevance to this once powerful organisation. It must also be interpreted as an attempt by Zawahiri to consolidate his own position within al-Qaeda. Upon the death of Bin Laden, there were many who were opposed to Zawahiri’s style of leadership.  Repeated failed attempts at fresh terrorist atrocities further served to undermine his leadership.

More troubling however is the al-Qaeda leader’s recent call for the ousting of Syria’s “pernicious, cancerous regime”. Whilst this too is an opportunistic attempt to gain popular appeal from the Arab Spring (a movement that took the al-Qaeda leadership by surprise), it remains a deeply troubling development on many fronts. First, it complicates the situation since it actually reinforces the Syrian government’s position that they are fighting armed terrorists as opposed to viciously responding to a popular uprising. Second, we should not forget that key hotspots in Syria like Homs have been known for their Islamist militancy. Hama, another hotspot, was also the seat of a previous attempt by the Muslim Brotherhood to overthrow the Assad regime in the 1980s. Third, the longer this 11 month old conflict drags on, the more it creates opportunities for al-Qaeda. The Director of the Brookings Doha Centre, Salman Shaikh, recently echoed these sentiments when he said, “The longer this goes on, we may get a permissive environment in Syria for these kinds of characters as the Syrian people get more and more desperate. I don’t think they [al-Qaeda] would be welcomed in Syria but there may be desperate people in Syria who are looking for any kind of help”.

For this reason, beyond the humanitarian imperative, the international community (including Beijing and Moscow) must support the Arab League’s proposal for a speedy resolution of the Syrian crisis.

 

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In view of the resurgence of Boko Haram in Nigeria, the strengthening of Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) following the Arab Spring in North Africa, not to mention the still active Al-Shabab threat in the Horn of Africa, it is essential that we re-examine Africa’s counter-terror security architecture.

This security architecture was initially established by the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) and its successor body, the African Union (AU), built on these foundations. In July 1992 OAU Heads of State met in Dakar, Senegal and adopted Resolution 213 which aimed to curb extremism. This was further strengthened in the June 1994 Summit when the Assembly of Heads of State rejected fanaticism and extremism. This was important given the context of the vicious Algerian civil war being waged at the time. The July 1999 Algiers Convention made clear that terrorism was not to be countenanced whilst Article 4 of the Constitutive Act of the AU echoed these sentiments. The adoption of the Common African Defence and Security Policy and the establishment of the African Centre for the Study and Research on Terrorism were similarly fundamental milestones in the fight against the scourge of terrorism on the African continent.

Since its inception the African Union’s main concern has been to reinforce and implement existing counter-terror instruments and to promote coordination between states and the regional organisations, the so-called Regional Economic Communities (RECs). The AU also sought to serve as an interface between the continent and the international community, especially the United Nations. In a very real sense, then, the state was and remains the primary instrument to combat terrorism whilst the AU sought to provide guidelines and strategies for collective and individual state action against terrorism.

This reliance on the African state, whilst understandable, is also the Achilles’ heel of any counter-terror efforts. There have been instances where political elites have made use of counter-terror legislation to consolidate their draconian rule thereby undermining the democratic aspirations of their citizens. The resultant popular alienation makes the populace vulnerable to the propaganda of extremist elements and renders genuine counter-terror efforts illegitimate. In other instances, states either over-state or under-state the magnitude of terrorism in their countries for their own reasons. Uganda’s President Yoweri Museveni, for instance, attempted to accentuate the linkages between Al-Qaeda and domestic terror groups like the West Nile Bank Front and the Lord’s Resistance Army. The point being made is that if the AU or the RECs are reliant upon information being supplied by state actors and if this information is deliberately tainted by narrower political considerations, then strategy formulated on such flawed information is bound to be ineffective, if not counter-productive.

There is however something even more worrisome and that is the growing criminalisation of the African state and the fact that terrorists are exploiting this to expand their influence into the state structures themselves. Recently, Nigerian President Goodluck Jonathan noted that Boko Haram sympathisers are located within the executive and legislative arms of government, in the judiciary, as well as in the armed forces, police and other security agencies. In South Africa, meanwhile, we have witnessed terror suspects being tipped off before police raids as well as the murder of terrorism trial witnesses under witness protection.. Indeed, in South Africa, Jackie Selebi, the former National Police Commissioner, shared information with a drug dealer resulting in him being sacked and jailed.

This raises the question as to why would countries share information with other countries, if those countries security services are leaking? In other words, it is one thing to foster regional and continental counter-terror regimes, as the AU has been attempting, it is quite another thing for such co-operation to take place in this context. Unless, there is a major overhaul of the African state, counter-terror efforts at continental level are bound to fail. Contract article -

One indication of the changed security situation in Mogadishu is the re-opening of the UN Political Office in this war-ravaged city after an absence of 17 years. Other embassies have followed suit reflecting greater confidence in the security situation. African Union forces in the form of AMISOM together with Somalia Transitional Federal Government (TFG) troops forced al-Shabab fighters from the capital in August 2011. Feeling more confident now that troops from Djibouti have joined the AMISOM mission which now numbers 12,000 another major offensive together with TFG forces was launched in January 2012. The results of this saw AMISOM and TFG forces taking control of Mogadishu University as well as Barakat cemetery and allowing these forces for the first time in years to be in a position to defend greater Mogadishu as opposed to just the city limits of the capital.

Meanwhile, Ethiopian forces captured Beledwyne, 30 kilometres from the Ethiopian border. The town is quite strategic in that it is the main artery linking the north and south of the country. From Beledweyen, Ethiiopian forces rapidly advanced to the central regions of Hiran and Galgadud displacing al-Shabab fighters there. Ethiopian troops have continued their rapid advance southwards into the heart of al-Shabab territory by forging an alliance with clan militias in the Shabelle River Valley.

In the south, al-Shabab fighters are also attempting to repulse a formidable force of Kenyan combat troops and local clan militias backed up by fighter jets and heavy armour. The Kenyans have been making significant territorial gains in Gedo and Juba. All this is compelling al-Shabab to fight on multiple fronts at a time when the movement is wracked by internal rivalry between Mukhtar Ali Robow and Sheikh Hassan Dahir Aweys on the one side and Ahmed Abdi Godane on the other. In addition, al-Shabab has also been losing some of its most important military commanders, such as Fazul Abdul Mohammed who was killed at a government roadblock in Mogadishu. Mohammed was al-Qaeda’s military operations chief in East Africa and a key Godane ally. With the loss of his key military planner, Godane’s rivals within al-Shabab might well think that now is an opportune moment to strike at Godane himself. At the same time, American drones continue to take out key military skilled foreign jihadis among the group. This month Lebanese national Bilaal Al-Barjawi, also known as Abu Hafsa, was killed in such a drone attack.

Whilst definitely, on the ropes, it is much too early to dismiss al-Shabab as a spent force. The movement has a history of rebounding following previous military defeats. For instance, al-Shabab has shifted back to guerrilla tactics and far from confronting foreign forces is once again using suicide truck bombs, like that used against the Ethiopian military base in Beledweyne which killed 10 Ethiopian soldiers. Moreover, there is an average of eight improvised explosive devices discovered or detonated every day in the capital.

Whilst doing well on the military front, AMISOM (together with the UN) needs to have a clear political strategy. Areas liberated from al-Shabab control are little more than tiny fiefdoms at the whim of the local militia commander. According to the UN, there are already between 14 and 20 “min-states” in the country. If the international community is serious about sustainable peace in this blighted country they need to give urgent attention to the overarching political strategy and not just focus on the military defeat of al-Shabab, important as this is as a short term goal.

 

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The tone of recent newspaper and journal articles can scarcely be more triumphant. Al Qaeda on the Ropes; The Rise and Fall of Al Qaeda and The End of the Road for Jihad are just some of the headlines at the newspaper stands in recent weeks. What accounts for this triumphalism? We are told that the Arab Spring has seen the politics of non-violent protest and the ballot box triumphing over the politics of the bullet and the suicide bomber.

We are told that the Arab Spring has severely undermined the Al Qaeda narrative. In his Knights Under the Banner of the Prophet, al-Qaeda leader Ayman al-Zawahiri argued that, ‘The international Jewish-Crusader alliance, led by America, will not allow any Muslim force to obtain power in any of the Muslim lands ... It will impose sanctions on whomever helps it, even if it does not declare war against them altogether. Therefore, to adjust to this new reality, we must prepare ourselves for a battle that is not defined to a single region but rather includes the apostate domestic enemy and the Jewish-Crusader external enemy.’ Yet rulers are being toppled generally non-violently and Western nations have either stood on the sidelines or actively supported the Arab street against repressive rulers. More importantly, Islamists have come to power via the ballot box in both Tunisia and, in more spectacular fashion, in Egypt. Whilst Zawahiri masterminded the attempted assassination of Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak in Ethiopia in 1995 and failed, young people in Tahrir Square managed to topple the “Pharaoh” through non-violent means.

Whilst the undermining of al-Qaeda’s narrative together with the death or incarceration of its senior leadership certainly raises questions as to the organisation’s future, it is far from certain that its goal towards the creation of several Islamist states on the way to a caliphate has been abandoned. After all, the victors of both the Tunisian and Egyptian polls were not exactly the young Facebook and Twitter activists desirous of a liberal democratic state. In both countries despite assurances to the contrary from the Islamists, Coptic Christians and their churches are being attacked in Egypt whilst in Tunisia female university students are being physically assaulted when not dressed “appropriately”. Is this Islamism by stealth? One of the Muslim Brotherhood’s early and most prominent ideologues, Sayyid Qutb, did not only influence generations of Muslim Brothers but also the very founders of al-Qaeda itself, especially Ayman al Zawahiri. If two organizations differ on tactics but agree on the same end-goal, does it really make the two organisations that different from each other?

The most recent edition of Newsweek has an interesting piece on how al-Qaeda’s traditional funders from the Persian Gulf are now supporting the Muslim Brothers and the Salafists at the polls. What do they know that we do not? Is this a case of al-Qaeda is Dead, Long Live al-Qaeda?

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More than eighty Christians have been killed in recent weeks in northern Nigeria following the ultimatum by the Islamist sect Boko Haram for Christians to leave the largely Muslim northern Nigeria. This only adds to the more than 500 killed last year by the group. The fact that these attacks took place despite the state of emergency existing in Yobe, Borno, Plateau and Niger states as well as a curfew in Adamawa state point to the inadequacy of the security response. Indeed, the security response itself is problematic.

The use of the military and its heavy-handed response has only served to alienate the local population. In one incident, Nigerian soldiers set fire to a whole street of cars, punishing residents for not warning them of a bomb attack. Part of the problem is that the army is a national force and not a local one and therefore does not share the cultural and ethnic background of local residents undermining both trust and sympathy. In the process, some locals are actively supporting Boko Haram. Whilst the group only consists of 300 fighters, its local sympathizers are said to number in their thousands. These sympathizers may also be in government. In a recent speech, Nigerian President Goodluck Jonathan claimed that Boko Haram sympathisers are also located within the executive and legislative arms of government, in the judiciary as well as in the armed forces, police and other security agencies. Clearly no counter-terrorism effort could be successful in this context and these supposed supporters need to be rooted out. In addition, the Nigerian government also needs to adopt a more focused intelligence-driven approach to counter-terrorism – one which would not alienate the local population. This however, is easier said than done. Professor Murray Last of University College London recently noted that, “Not even the intelligence people in Nigeria know the leadership [of Boko Haram], they are not on top of it at all”.

Any sustainable counter-terrorism effort also needs to consider the broader context in which Boko Haram thrives. Beyond the obvious religious dimensions of the conflict in terms of the demand for sharia law, there is also the socio-economic context. 75 percent of Northern Nigerians live in poverty compared with 27 percent in the South resulting in Northern Nigerians becoming increasingly alienated from Abuja and the central government. Religious differences between North and South are also compounded by ethnic divides. In the volatile mixed city of Jos, for instance, religious and ethnic divides reinforce each other pitting the Christian Berom against the Muslim Hausa.

Commenting on the deteriorating security situation, a hapless President Jonathan drew parallels between Nigeria now and during the 1967-1970 Biafra War when a million people were killed. The difference he lamented was that at least then one knew who and where the enemy was. In the current situation neither does the Nigerian state know who Boko Haram is or where and when they will strike next. Small wonder then, that Nigerian Christians have lost faith in their government’s ability to deal with Boko Haram with Reverend Ayo Oritsejafor, the President of the Christian Association of Nigeria branding the attacks on Christians and churches as a `declaration of war’ – one in which Christians `have no choice but to respond appropriately’.

Whilst sectarian strife threatens Nigeria, US General Carter Ham, head of the US military Africa Command warned that Boko Haram may be expanding because of an alliance with Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb and Somali-based and Al Qaeda aligned Shabaab. This, in turn, raises the danger of overlapping and reinforcing extremist Islamist networks from East Africa to the Sahel and Sahara.

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Whilst Nigerian President Goodluck Jonathan has vowed to crush the militant Islamist sect Boko Haram, following their murderous attacks on Christian Churches on Christmas Day which left dozens dead, the Nigerian state has clearly taken their eyes off the ball. His Administration and allowed Boko Haram to transform from being a violent cult to posing a national security threat to the Nigerian state as a whole.

Boko Haram’s terrorist attacks have increasingly displayed growing sophistication in terms of weapons used, the nature of the attacks as well as the targets chosen. From the use of bows and poisoned arrows to small arms, Boko Haram has increasingly started using fuel-laden motorcycles, car bombings and suicide bombings. Since its formation in 2002, their modus operandi has also matured from drive-by shootings on motorcycles to multiple person teams involved in co-ordinated bombings. The increasingly confident nature of the attacks also transformed Boko Haram from constituting a local terror group to a national and potentially international one. Whilst initially focusing on local police stations and local politicians, the suicide bombing of the national police headquarters in Abuja and the bombing of the UN headquarters in Abuja clearly point to Boko Haram’s growing ability to wreak havoc. The greater sophistication demonstrated by the group in its terror attacks also suggest that they may well be receiving assistance from like-minded groups like Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and Al Shabab in Somalia. Since late 2008, AQIM and Boko Haram have been in contact and the choice of the attack on the UN in Abuja reflects AQIM’s own choice of targets. In December 2007, AQIM launched a suicide attack on the UN headquarters in Algiers. This, in turn, raises an intriguing question: how much of influence does AQIM exercise over Boko Haram?

Whilst Boko Haram has grown in strength, constituting an ever graver challenge to Abuja, the Nigerian state vacillated in its response. On the one hand it adopted a violent crackdown on the group, but as this was not intelligence-driven many innocent northern Muslims suffered at the hands of the heavy-handed tactics of the Nigerian security apparatus. Such an approach proved counter-productive and may well have resulted in more recruits for Boko Haram. Another approach which was mooted was some sort of immunity for Boko Haram and bringing them into the political process in exchange for their giving up violence. But the organization has scoffed at such “weakness” on the part of the Nigerian state, believing the state to be illegitimate and pressing on with its demand to have all 36 states to be ruled by Sharia law and not just the current 12 states in northern Nigeria.

Following his promise to crush Boko Haram, President Jonathan has instituted a state of emergency in several Nigerian states, closed some of the country’s borders with neighbouring countries and ordered the Chief of Defence to establish a counter-terrorism unit to eradicate the scourge of Boko Haram. Whilst some of the measures like the closing of the country’s borders make sense, given the AQIM presence in neighbouring Niger, others clearly do not. For instance, it is hard to see how any counter-terrorism unit could be successful fighting the terrorism threat posed by Boko Haram blind-folded. Consider here just one aspect: since the killing of its founder-leader, Mohamed Yusuf, nothing is known about its structure and chain of command or the identity of its current leadership. In other words, how are the security forces supposed to fight an organization it has so little intelligence on?

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This week marks the first anniversary of the self-immolation of Mohammed Bouazizi, the Tunisian street vendor, whose death triggered the Arab Spring. Looking at the celebrations in his home town and across the Middle East one would swear that Bouazizi has reached the cult status of an American rock star. Yet, any rational person would view the young man’s death as the height of despair, and rather a depressing episode. It was an act of extreme despair which motivated the young fruit seller to pour gasoline over himself and set himself alight following the confiscation of his cart. Yet Bouazizi and his family hold an honoured position now in Arab society. I would never forget a ten year old Egyptian boy informing me that he wants to be a martyr whilst his friends looked upon him with approval. I recall thinking that my own son was about this boy’s age and I wanted him to live not die!

This fascination with the death and its concomitant cult of the martyr needs to be countered and needs to form a central pillar in counter-terror efforts. After all before a suicide bomber detonates his or her vest he/she must be ideologically indoctrinated to believe that he/she is doing the “right” thing – both in terms of the act and the target. Moreover, such an act exists within a social milieu in which such acts are not only condoned but also lauded. For this reason Martha Crenshaw believes that martyrdom has a cultural base, ‘Unless martyrdom was valued by society or at least by a sub-culture, individuals would not seek it’. Moreover religious authorities in Muslim societies often gave legitimacy to such acts by sanctioning them. As Crenshaw goes on to state, ‘The martyrs were widely revered in Muslim society. In some cases, the individual who changes his mind about carrying out an attack was scorned as a “half-martyr”’.

Groups like Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) have certainly capitalized on this cult of the martyr. Robert Fowler, a former UN special envoy to Niger who was held captive by AQIM for four months between 2008 and 2009 noted that one of his captors informed him, “We fight to die, you fight to go home to your wife and kids. Guess who will win?” This love of death has fundamentally altered the challenge that terrorism poses to security officials everywhere. The seriousness of these profound challenges to counter-terrorism experts is summarized by British Lord Chalfont, ‘…the whole time I have been involved in [counter-] terrorist organizations, which goes back 30 years, my enemy has always been a man who is very worried about his own skin. You can no longer count on that, because the terrorist is not just prepared to get killed, he wants to get killed’.

Closely related to this love of death, is a profound negation of the status quo which is almost anarchic. Indeed violence, destruction and terror almost become an end in itself as confrontation with the proverbial other is actively sought. Indeed Al Qaeda itself is quite clear on its stance regarding dialogue, debate and diplomacy. Its training manual notes, ‘The confrontation that we are calling for with the apostate regimes does not know Socratic debates, Platonic ideals nor Aristotelian diplomacy. But it knows the dialogue of the bullet, the ideals of assassination, bombing and destruction, and the diplomacy of the cannon and machine gun’.

From a counter-terror perspective, those agents and institutions of socialization which promote the cult of the martyr will have to be identified and neutralized to prevent a new generation of jihadists from emerging.

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