In his analysis of the newest issue of AQAP’s Inspire magazine, ICSR’s Shiraz Maher points out that although it includes a sectarian rant against Shiism, there is also a small and rather strange disclaimer about the Zaydi Shi’a:

…our war is with the Rafidha Shi’a sect which is alien to Yemen and was only imported from Iran, and not with the Zaydi Shi’a sect which is considered to be the closest sect of Shi’a to ahl as-Sunnah [Sunni Islam]

Each al-Qaeda offshoot has its own operating procedures and takes little to no strategic or tactical direction from the so-called al-Qaeda ‘core’, which is unlikely to share the same views about the Zaydis. Fierce anti-Shiite sectarianism is a staple part of al-Qaeda’s ideology, and this apparent concession to Zaydism represents a significant shift in strategic thought.

In October of last year, ICSR Associate Fellow, Ryan Evans, wrote for West Point’s CTC Sentinel about the strategic lessons that AQAP has learned from the experiences of its counterparts in Iraq. He noted that, unlike al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI), AQAP ‘seeks to co-opt existing social and political structures and genuinely adopt the grievances and interests of Yemenis, particularly those in the tribal regions of the country.’ One of AQI’s primary failures was its unrelenting adherence to the jihadist ideology, even if it came (as it often did) at the expense of the local population. Little effort was made to win over locals and tribes, and this lead to its eventual downfall after the Sunni tribal ‘Awakening’. In Yemen on the Brink, Sarah Phillips also claims that AQAP is unlike previous incarnations of al-Qaeda in Iraq and Somalia, where its ‘internationalist tendencies and exclusive ideology conflicted with local norms’.

 

AQAP Leadership: (From left to right) Abu Hurayrah Qasim al Raymi, Said Ali al Shihri, Abu Basir Nasir al Wuhayshi, Abu Hareth Muhammad al Awfi  (Courtesy of Nick Grace)

AQAP has already shown its willingness to (temporarily at least) overlook certain aspects of its global ideology for strategic purposes, adopting much of the local, tribal grievances and animosity toward the central Government in Sana’a. It has worked closely with tribes, whose purely local and national concerns no doubt clash with al-Qaeda’s worldview, and is, according to Greg Johnsen, ‘now more accepted as a legitimate organization’ by many average Yemenis.

AQAP’s determination to see the downfall of the Saleh government has even led to the group's head, Nasir al-Wuhayshi, to publically give his his support to the rebels in Southern Yemen currently fighting the regime, despite the Southern secessionists’ nationalist nature and Marxist background (though it would not be accurate to refer to the Southern Movement as a whole as Marxist). His comments did, however, come with a jihadi disclaimer, reminding the rebels that the only way to achieve true victory is through the adoption of sharia. AQAP’s Ghalib Abdullah al-Zaidi also clarified his organisation’s ostensive maintenance of its ideology when he said, ‘If they [Southern Yemeni rebels] continue adopting socialist or communist ideas, we will not join them’. But even this is a far cry from the al-Qaeda of old, who would have had much more to say (and do) about suggestions of a nearby Communist insurgency than this.

It is in this context that Inspire’s sympathetic words about the Zaydis should be seen – AQAP is determined not the make the same mistakes as its comrades in other regions and, as Jenkins highlights, is becoming more ‘adept at integrating...in local political struggles’. She also warns, however, that AQAP has been careful not to explicitly reject any core aspects of the Salafi-jihadist ideology and this will likely lead to its downfall in the region. Eventually, local Yemeni tribal concerns will clash with al-Qaeda’s global aspirations and the relationships will sour, but this is in the long term. If AQAP stick to its strategy, the next few years may see a strengthening of tribal ties and therefore an increase in safe-havens for its operatives.

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Reproduced below is a blog I wrote yesterday for Standpoint Magazine, which I hope ICSR readers will be interested in (also, some of the content is owed to a current King's War Studies PhD student):

Reports from Afghanistan are heralding a recent deal between the US forces and tribal leaders in Sangin, central Helmand. The source of nearly a third of British military casualties, it is among the most perilous regions in Afghanistan for ISAF forces.

The deal, made with 25 senior members of the Alikozai tribe on New Year’s Day, consists of a pledge by the tribal leaders to stop insurgent operations, expel foreign fighters and help pinpoint the locations of IEDs. In exchange, the coalition has released at least one prisoner and promised both infrastructural development and a reduction in the amount of house searches and airstrikes.

Maj. Gen. Richard Mills, commanding general of Regional Command Southwest, sounds very optimistic:

I believe many of the Afghans in Sangin look to successful areas such as Nawa and Lashkar Gah and they want that same progress in their district. They want schools, medical clinics, and the freedom to move about without fear of the insurgency.

This was primarily an Afghan brokered agreement arrived at in close consultation with local coalition forces. It would allow for security conditions around Sangin similar to those already in place in other parts of the province.

Although most reports deny any signed agreement, it appears that the Alikozai elders also handed over a (possibly informal) written document, signed by seven Taliban commanders, to the Afghan government and the coalition. Paula Broadwell, a PhD student at King’s College, London, and expert in military strategy who is currently conducting research in the region, told me this week that in the document, the Taliban members “swear to obey the elders’ decision.” She was also quite hopeful, observing that:

It is a significant development with much broader implications than reintegration, though ISAF is cautiously optimistic this will reduce the fighting in the area. It will probably take some time before insurgents come forward to demobilise and join the reintegration program.

Others are not quite as resolute about the likelihood of success, and warn against assuming that tribal elders wield the same sort of influence as those in Anbar during 'the Awakening' in Iraq.

Hopeful: US Marines from India Company, 3rd Battalion, 5th Marines in Sangin (Courtesty of: Dusan Vranic/The Associated Press)

In Barnett Rubin’s The Fragmentation of Afghanistan, he questions how much influence old tribal structures now have among Pashtuns. He claims that migration over the past century among Pashtun families means that although they have ‘retained their identity as Pashtuns or their memory of tribal descent…they do not live among fellow tribesman or participate in tribal political institutions.’

Analysts like Joshua Foust also caution against viewing tribes in Afghanistan as hierarchically structured social and political entities. An elder's word may have some weight, but does not count as a command that will be reliably obeyed by a significant number of fellow tribesmen.

Whereas in other hot-zones in the war on terror – such as Yemen, Somalia and certain sections of Iraq – tribal affiliation can be one of the most definitive indicators of loyalty, this is by no means the case in Afghanistan. Seen on its own, it is unlikely to serve as a reliable predictor for the reliability of group or individual decision-making promises.

Writing in February of last year in The National, Foust bemoans the assumption that tribes are the strongest influence over Afghans as “one of the most frustrating assertions about Afghanistan, directly contradicted by decades of academic research.” Tribal affiliation, according to Foust, is by no means an Afghan’s primary source of identity, and the Taliban is defined by its non-tribal organisational structure.

Problems with the strategy may also arise from the plan to channel material support to the Alikozai. Such initiatives often lead to tensions both within the tribe as well as with other local tribes.

Similar to most other projects in this theatre, only time will tell whether the elders can follow through with their assurances and gradually squeeze the Taliban out of the area. However, considering the recent insistence of both the US and UK governments on setting strict timelines for military withdrawal, the clock is ticking in the Taliban’s favour.

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Saudi cleric Salman al-Ouda has issued a public criticism of Anwar al-Awlaki, telling him to stop the bloodshed and violence he has helped unleash. He warns him that, upon his death, he will be answerable to God for his crimes.

According to al-Arabiya, Ouda made a TV appeal to the al-Qaeda ideologue, saying:

Whether you like it or not, you will find yourself having to face your fellow Muslims. You might think yourself to be in control of things at the beginning but you won't be in control at the end. Things might develop in ways you will not be happy with.

The single-minded pursuit of resistance and fighting will not improve the state of the people. It will not develop them morally, nor will it strengthen their faith. It can neither foster economic development nor stabilize society. It won’t build mosques, schools or factories. It does nothing but harm others, and more often, it harms the perpetrator more than the people he targets.

Ouda is a very interesting figure in the world of Salafism. He first came to prominence as a figurehead of the Sahwa, one of the original political Salafi reform movements. Categorised by the scholar Quintan Wictorowicz as ‘politicos’, the Sahwa emerged in the 1970s and 80s when senior members of the Muslim Brotherhood, including Sayyid’s Qutb’s brother Mohammed, began to exert influence over previously apolitical Salafist thought in Saudi Arabia. The movement was heavily critical of the so called ‘purist’ or apolitical Salafi establishment ulema [clerics] within the regime, who they saw as corrupt, dangerously pro-Western and unable to respond to political developments around them. They came to prominence when, in 1990, the Saudi Royal Family decided to allow American troops on Saudi soil during the run up to the first Gulf War. This was seen by Ouda and others as a sign of capitulation to secular Western forces bent on destroying Islam.

 

Anti-Jihadist Salafi: Saudi's Salman al-Ouda

Due to his continued attempts to undermine the regime and sow dissent, he was imprisoned by the Royal Family in 1994. However, since his release in 1999, according to Thomas Hegghammer, ‘Awda has taken a less confrontational stance against the government, promoted dialogue with the West and recognised non-Wahhabi Islamic traditions in the Kingdom.’

It is from political Salafi movements like the Sahwa that Salafi-jihadist thought emerged, inspiring the likes of Osama bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri to support violent action in pursuit of politico Salafi goals. Indeed, in his 1994 open letter condemning Saudi establishment Sheikh, Abd-al-Aziz bin Baz, for issuing a fatwa calling for peace with Israel, bin Laden refers approvingly to Ouda on a number of occasions. Referring to bin Baz’ involvement in the imprisonment of Ouda, bin Laden writes:

When the regime decided to attack Shaykh Salman al-'Awdah and [fellow Sahwa Sheikh] Shaykh Safar al-Hawali who proclaimed the truth and suffered for the sake of God, it obtained a Fatwa from you allowing all - the attacks and maltreatment to which the two Shaykhs and the preachers, Shaykhs and youth of the Ummah had been subjected. May God release them and save from them the wrong of the wrongdoers.

Since the emergence of al-Qaeda as a worldwide terrorist franchise, responsible for the deaths of countless numbers of Muslims, figures like Ouda have taken it upon themselves to issue denunciations of bin Laden and Zawahiri. Before his recent critique of Awlaki, Ouda wrote a famous open letter to bin Laden, urging him to lay down his arms. It begins in a similar vein to the Awlaki exhortation, warning him that he will be answerable for his crimes against humanity on the day of his judgement:

How much blood has been spilled? How many innocent children, women, and old people have been killed, maimed, and expelled from their homes in the name of “al-Qaeda”?

Are you happy to meet Allah with this heavy burden on your shoulders? It is a weighty burden indeed – at least hundreds of thousands of innocent people, if not millions.

Awlaki, who in his blog claims to have briefly studied under Ouda during his Islamic education, is unlikely to heed this latest critique, and will most probably attempt to issue a response. His desire for legitimacy within the Salafi movement is already reflected in his recent article for the second issue of Inspire magazine, in which he responds to recent Salafi attacks on his methods, attempting to claim the theological and strategic high-ground.

Salafi denunciations like Ouda’s are a welcome development, but there is still much debate surrounding the role that ‘purist’ Salafis should play in acting as bulwarks against their violent counterparts. This was brought to the fore recently when it emerged that the Stockholm bomber, Taimor Abdulwahab al-Abdaly, attended Luton’s Salafi mosque, the Masjid al-Ghurabaa. The mosque’s leaders were aware of his extreme takfiri views, but decided not to report him to the police, claiming that his views were in no way illegal.

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Reports are still sketchy, but we are gradually building a picture of the life of Taimur Abdulwahab al-Abdaly, the Stockholm bomber. Of the more interesting details is that, until two weeks ago, he was living in Luton with his wife and young children.

According to his profile on Islamic dating site, Muslima.com:

I was born in Baghdad, Iraq. We moved to Sweden in 1992. I moved to UK 2001 to study. I have Bacholar [sic] degree in physical therapy. Iam [sic] married sence [sic] 2004 and have 2 girls. One is 3.6 and the second is 1.6 years old. I want to get married again, and would like to have a BIG family. My wife agreed to.

He was hoping to use the site to find a second wife to live with his existing family, and elsewhere in the profile (which is mainly in Arabic), he describes himself as a ‘very religious’ person who speaks English, Arabic and Swedish. The profile ends with a personal message to whoever may be interested:

 

Looking for a practicing [sic] girl, to join a lovely family and make it bigger. Looking for someone to accept the deen [religion] of Allah as it is and don’t [sic] have anything against to be [sic] second wife. I will Inshallah be equal to both in everything. As the prophet SAW sed [sic], merry [sic] them for their religion, family, money and beauty... I'am [sic] looking mostely [sic] for religion ... If you have one or more of what the prophet recomend [sic], please get in touch.

Fascinating as these details about him may be, they tell us little about his motivations for attempted mass murder. His audio recording made just before the attack fleshes this out somewhat. As well as referring to Western involvement in Afghanistan and Iraq, he also demands: ‘stop your drawings of our Prophet[…]’

al-Abdaly's Profile Picture from Islamic Match Making Site

The Mohammed cartoons seem to be the main focus of his ire and if claims of his connections with al-Qaeda in Yemen (AQAP) are true, this is of little surprise. Soon after the attack in Stockholm, Shumukh al-Islam – a Yemeni militant website – claimed al-Abdaly as their own:

It is our brother, mujahid Taymour Abdel Wahab, who carried out the martyrdom operation in Stockholm.

This link is yet to be confirmed, but it is worth pointing out at this early stage that for AQAP, and their main English-language ideologue Anwar al-Awlaki, the Mohammed cartoons saga is something of a pet peeve. In the first issue of their English propaganda magazine, Inspire, they refer to their ‘Dust Will Never Settle Down Campaign’ which aims to terrorise and kill anyone who defames or insults Mohammed. The campaign is named after a lecture Awlaki gave in 2008, in which he justified the killing of any of the Mohammed cartoonists by referring to the experiences of the Prophet during his life. Referring to the murder of a Jewish poet who had defamed Mohammed:

The prophet said "If he had calmed down, like others who follow his opinion, are of the same opinion as his, have calmed down, he wouldn't have been assassinated. But he has harmed us and he has defamed us with his poetry and none of you would do this, except we would deal with him with the sword.

[...]

But he spoke against us. He spoke against me and he defamed me with his poetry. And then he made it clear to the Jews — if any one of you, you the Jews, or the polytheists, if any one of you try to defame me through your words, this will be the way we deal with you. There is nothing between us and you except the sword. There will be no dialogue, there will be no forgiveness, there will be no building of bridges, there will be no attempts of reconciliation, there will only be the sword between me and you.

Writing for Inspire two years later, Awlaki expands on the points he made during this lecture, stating that the only solution to this ‘growing campaign of defamation’ is:

the execution of those involved. A soul that is so debased, as to enjoy the ridicule of the Messenger of Allah the mercy to mankind; a soul that is so ungrateful towards its Lord that it defames the Prophet of the religion Allah has chosen for his creation does not deserve life, does not deserve to breathe the air created by Allah and enjoy a life provided for by Allah. Their proper abode is Hellfire.

He also places quite a premium on the duty of killing those who cross the boundaries he has set:

Defending the Messenger of Allah is a greater cause than fighting for Palestine, Afghanistan or Iraq; it is greater than fighting for the protection of Muslim life, honor or wealth. This is the pinnacle of all deeds

His target list also expands beyond those ‘active participants’ to the society that has allowed them to operate:

These perpetrators are not operating in a vacuum. Instead they are operating within a system that is offering them support and protection

[…]

Because they are practicing a "right" that is defended by the law, they have the backing of the entire Western political system. This would make the attacking of any Western target legal from an Islamic viewpoint. The entire Western system is staunchly protecting and promoting the defamation of Muhammad and therefore, it is the entire Western system that is at war with Islam. Assassinations, bombings, and acts of arson are all legitimate forms of revenge against a system that relishes the sacrilege of Islam in the name of freedom.

Awlaki’s article is preceded by a list of  the top nine individuals AQAP sees as leading this campaign of defamation.  As well as the usual suspects Ayaan Hirsi Ali and Salman Rushdie, it includes the Swedish cartoonist, Lars Vilks, and his publisher Ulf Johansson. In 2007, Johansson’s paper, Nerikes Allehande, published Vilks’ cartoon depicting Mohammed with the body of a dog.

Whether or not al-Abdaly was directly inspired by AQAP or Awlaki is not yet clear, though judging by his time in London, where Awlaki has long been a celebrity, and his motivations for murder, this is by no means a ludicrous suggestion.

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Over the last few months, this blog has covered various news stories about the persecution of Ahmadi Muslims, both in this country and abroad. Most recently, Dr. John Bew flagged up a disturbing report from Surrey, where a man was arrested for distributing leaflets inciting the murder of ‘Qadianis’ (a derogatory term for Ahmadis).

Channel 4’s recent report on the extent of the threat to Britain’s Ahmadis is one of the best investigations into this problem to date. The wellspring of this ongoing campaign is not, as one may expect, the ideology Britain’s increasingly anti-Muslim far-right, but rather extremist Islamism ‘being exported from Pakistan onto the streets of the UK.’

Channel 4 has found that the discrimination of Ahmadis in Britain ranges from them losing their jobs after refusing to denounce their beliefs, to physical attacks on the streets. They also found that the source of much of this sectarian hate mongering is the British wing of Khatme Nubbawat, a Pakistani group formed in order to prevent the spread of Ahmadi beliefs and practices. According to the Khatme Nubbawat’s website, ‘Qadianis...fraudulently claim to be one of the Muslim sects but infact [sic] they are [sic] unrighteous cult, kafir and non-muslim’, and the purpose of their organisation is ‘to educate the Muslims about the reality of Qadiyanism keeping within the law of the country.’

As well as producing and disseminating anti-Ahmadi leaflets, Khatme Nubbawat also organises conferences, with the most recent one held on 18 June in Newham. According to a report on the event by the Independent, one of the speakers claimed that the attacks on two Ahmadi mosques in Lahore which left 93 dead were an Ahmadi conspiracy:

Imam Suhail Bawa, a leading Khatme Nubbawat preacher, told worshippers: "This will become apparent very soon to you all that Qadiani [a derogatory term for Ahmadis] themselves are behind this whole conspiracy. [They] are responsible for whatever has happened in Lahore. This is all Qadiani conspiracy. They now come to television programs to try to "falsely" demonstrate their victimisation."

The same report also quotes the Khatme Nubbawat preacher threatening a repeat of the1953 massacre of Ahmadis in Lahore if any attempts were made to change blasphemy laws in Pakistan which currently forbid Ahmadis from calling themselves Muslim:

If the anti-Qadiani laws or the blasphemy laws are touched by anyone in Pakistan then the 1953 Lahore agitation against the Qadianis will be repeated in the streets once more. The streets and roads of Lahore were filled with blood in that agitation.

Thus far, the Crown Prosecution Service has not been convinced that the level of hatred being incited by Khatme Nubbawat has reached criminal proportions, but according to Channel 4 the Amhadi community is attempting to persuade them to take another look. Here is a video of the investigation.

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It was reported last week that a British man who was a contributor to RevolutionMuslim.com – a US-based jihadist website – has been arrested and charged with soliciting murder. It is believed that Bilal Zaheer Ahmad is responsible for posting the now notorious list of British MPs who voted in favour of the Iraq war as well as a blog praising the actions of Roshonara Choudhry, the former British student who stabbed British MP Stephen Timms. The charges include soliciting to murder and possessing information likely to be useful to a person committing or preparing an act of terrorism.

 

 Inspiration for Jihad: Revolution Muslim's Logo

I should take this opportunity to note that nearly two weeks before this arrest, ICSR research, as featured in the Times, found extensive connections between the US-based Revolution Muslim site and British extremists, some of whom are linked with the now banned al-Muhajiroun organisation. This was based on our extensive monitoring of such online forums, and on comments made by extremists themselves.

In September, former head of al-Muhajiroun Anjem Choudhry was quoted lending his support to Revolution Muslim, claiming that they ‘are on the verge of something big’. He also presented them as a fledgling version of his banned organisation saying that extremist groups in the UK are over a decade ahead of their US counterparts:

The Muslim community in Britain are a good five or 10 years ahead of America. What they were talking about now, we've been talking about for the last 15 years.

 

Now they've suddenly started to call for the sharia and are coming out publicly...In general there's more freedom there.

 

In the videos they are openly calling for jihad on the streets of New York whereas we can't do that anymore here because you have [a law against] glorification of terrorism.

More recently, former Revolution Muslim blogger Abdullah Ali Zulfiqar, wrote in October lamenting the undue influence over the site from British members:

Today not a single member of Revolution Muslim is American as far as I know. A majority of its members, writers, and bloggers are from the United Kingdom and are affiliated with or even members of Al Muhajiroon with its many sub-groups, at least the more active ones and open.

If Zaheer Ahmad is found to be guilty, he will be the latest in a line of individuals connected with Revolution Muslim to be involved in terrorist activity. These include:

• Samir Khan – was involved in posting on Revolution Muslim around 2007, before moving on to become a member of Yemen’s AQAP, and the suspected author of ‘Inspire’, an online English-language AQAP recruitment and propaganda magazine
  
• Zachary Adam Chesser – heavily involved with activism for Revolution Muslim. Pled guilty in October for attempting provide material support to the Somali al-Shabaab militia, and communicating threats and soliciting crimes of violence after suggesting on the site that the makers of South Park should be killed for mocking Mohammed in their show
  
• Coleen LaRose – posted on Revolution Muslim under the name of ‘Jihad Jane’. She is now in custody, charged with plotting to kill a Swedish cartoonist whose work depicted Mohammed
  
• Roshonara Choudhry – when asked during a police interview what online sources had contributed in encouraging her to carry out murder in the name of Islam, she named Revolution Muslim among others.

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In the wake of revelations that Roshonara Choudary - who stabbed Stephen Timms MP because of his support for the Iraq war - was radicalised after accessing sermons by al-Qaeda recruiter Anwar al-Awlaki online, the Daily Telegraph reports that Baroness Pauline Neville Jones, the security minister, has called on the White House to ensure the removal of his sermons from any US-based websites, including Youtube. Speaking to the Brookings Institute in Washington, DC, she said:

When you have incitement to murder, when you have people actively calling for the killing of their fellow citizens and when you have the means to stop that person doing so, then I believe we should act.

Those websites would categorically not be allowed in the UK.

They incite cold-blooded murder and as such are surely contrary to the public good.
If they were hosted in the UK then we would take them down but this is a global problem. Many of these websites are hosted in America and we look forward to working even more closely with you to take down this hateful material.

Architect of a Global Jihadist Insurgency:  Screenshot of an Awlaki Interview

Indeed, there is no doubt that extremist Islamist materials are available on mainstream websites, but the problem is more complex than simply shutting down websites and forcing Youtube to remove the works of extremists. This is an issue which our recent report, ‘The Challenge of Online Radicalisation: A Strategy for Action’, covers in great detail. We argue that the problem of online radicalisation will require more nuanced responses such as:

• the creation of an independent panel, jointly funded by industry and government, that will seek to strengthen the processes through which internet users can hold internet companies to account for the content that is published on their platforms
• the founding of a start-up fund that will empower websites that counter the jihadist ideology
• more focus on individual prosecutions where laws have been broken

According to ICSR Co-Director, Dr. Peter Neumann:

at ICSR, we have studied the problem of online radicalization for nearly two years now. Policy makers need to understand that there is no easy technical solution - closing down websites or removing controversial, yet legal, content is crude, expensive and counterproductive. In addition, senior intelligence officials around the world have told us that it's better to monitor these websites than censor them. They are goldmines for counter-terrorist intelligence.

It is also worth noting that the very nature of the internet makes it impossible to stop the dissemination of extremist materials, as soon as one site is taken down, another appears with a slightly different name, sometimes in a matter of minutes. Also, if Youtube were to begin removing all of Awlaki’s sermons, they would find that many of them do not explicitly call for violence, and instead reinforce certain aspects of Islamist ideology or recount stories from the Koran and Hadith. It is not for Youtube to decide where the line should be drawn on this issue, and more guidance from the government and expert research institutes is required.

UPDATE

According to the Daily Telegraph, Youtube have now begun removing Awlaki's materials from their site. 

 

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As more information becomes available about the recent cargo bomb plot, it is becoming increasingly likely that al-Qaeda’s Yemeni branch, al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), were behind the attempt to detonate PETN explosives.

 

 AQAP: The New Threat

ICSR’s Israeli partner organisation, the International Institute for Counter-Terrorism (a part of the Inter-Disciplinary Centre in Herzeliya), recently released an extensive and authoritative document about the origins, capabilities and ideology of AQAP which we recommend to anyone seeking a firm grasp on the origins of the current situation. ‘Yemen: The Campaign against Global Jihad and the Houthis – Situation Report and Directions of Development’ can be downloaded here, and below are provided a number of the key extracts.

Organisational Development 2000-2010

Al-Qaeda’s first leader in Yemen was Abu Ali Al-Harethi. Following the 9/11 attacks, most of Al-Qaeda’s local leadership in Yemen, including Al-Harethi himself, were killed or arrested. Between 2002 and 2006, Al-Qaeda cells in Yemen were disbanded and most of their members were eliminated. The remaining infrastructure in Yemen was very active in recruiting and sending activists to the Jihad theatres in Iraq, Afghanistan, Somalia etc., and in spreading ideas, reports and propaganda materials relating to these fronts.

[…]

February 3rd 2006 was an important milestone for Al-Qaeda in Yemen and in general. Twenty three terrorist activists, including Al-Qaeda commanders, escaped from a secure prison in Yemen. All the local organization’s cells in Yemen were reunited under a new leadership who had sworn allegiance (whilst still in prison) to Abu Basir Nasir Abd Al-Karim Al-Wahishi, the organization’s Amir who was in his 30s. The new leadership built training camps and opened communications with all of Al-Qaeda’s affiliates around the world, including the main leadership in Afghanistan. New recruits swore their allegiance to the new organization in Yemen after it received the mandate of the general leadership from Ayman Al-Zawahiri in November 2008.

[…]

In 2008 Al-Qaeda in Yemen founded a media institute called “Al-Malahem” (The Battles), through which it publishes a periodical magazine called “Sada Al- Malahem” (Echo of the Battles),13 videos, audio tapes, official announcements and other publications. In June 2010 a new Jihadi magazine in English was posted on the Jihadi forums, called “Inspire”.

[…]

In January 2009 the merging of Al-Qaeda in Saudi Arabia with the organization's branch in Yemen was announced, under the umbrella of “Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula”, and the organization’s headquarters were set up in Yemen. Following the declaration, many young activists from Saudi Arabia came to strengthen the existing organizational infrastructure.

[…]

On January 11th 2010, the Al-Jazeera station aired a show on “The future of Al- Qaeda in Yemen”. On the show, Abd Al-Bari Taher, former chairman of the Journalists’ Union in Yemen, said that there are various estimates of the size of Al-Qaeda in Yemen. According to him, the organization numbers from hundreds to thousands of activists, including those who have infiltrated the security systems, the army and the state’s important sectors. In addition, the organization is active within the Yemeni tribes, which constitute a hothouse for Jihad entities.

Abdul Ela Haydar Sha’i, the Yemeni journalist who is close to the leadership of Al- Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, describes the two tiers of the Al-Qaeda organization in Yemen. The organization's first tier is the cells which are subject to the main mechanism in Afghanistan, led by Osama bin Laden. These few cells pledged their allegiance (Bayaa)20 directly to bin Laden, and are dispersed across various regions throughout Yemen. The second tier is the ideological system, which has a hold on various aspects of Yemeni society. Sha’i notes that after the terrorist attacks in Madrid (March 2004), Al-Qaeda published an announcement

Yemen as an Ideological and Strategic Base for al-Qaeda

The importance attributed to Yemen has been rooted in Al-Qaeda’s ideology for over ten years. Even though some link it to Osama bin Laden’s Yemeni origins, the Salafi-Jihadi movement has a geopolitical ideology directly pertaining to Yemen. This is perhaps best embodied in the figurehead of Omar Abd Al-Hakim, also called “Abu Musab Al-Suri”, who is considered to be one of the most important ideologists of this faction, and is thought to be currently detained in Pakistan.

This significance was already seen in 1999 when Al-Suri wrote a 31-page essay titled “The responsibility of the people of Yemen towards their sanctities and resources”. The essay stated that the demographic makeup of Yemen, as well as the Yemeni stubbornness and poverty, alongside the topographical component(i.e. the many mountainous regions in Yemen), make Yemen a natural fortress for all the Jihad fighters in the Arabian Peninsula and the entire Middle East.26 In addition, Yemen has open borders which are spread over more than 4,000 km and a coastline of over 3,000 km. Furthermore, it commands one of the most important straits – the Bab Al-Mandeb Strait. Another component is the accessibility of weapons and ammunition due to the prevalent tribal tradition in the country. All of these, according to Al-Suri, are major factors in making Yemen a launch pad for the Jihad which is meant to purify the sanctities of Islam and bring back the natural resources robbed from the residents of the Arabian Peninsula and the Muslims. Therefore, Al-Suri calls for the establishment of an Islamic force comprised of people from Yemen, residents of the Arabian Peninsula and Muslims in general, that will take up position in Yemen as a departure point for attacking “enemies” all over the Arabian Peninsula.

 

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Back in late September, ICSR was widely referred to in the media when we highlighted the wide availability of Anwar al-Awlaki’s speeches on Youtube and the potential radicalising effect that this can have. It now seems we weren’t the only ones who were concerned, as last weekend Rep. Anthony Wiener (D-New York) publically called for the online video sharing group to remove the hundreds of videos of Awlaki that are readily available on their site.

From a CNN report:

In his letter to Youtube Chief Executive, Chad Hurley, Weiner wrote:

A known terrorist named Anwar al-Awlaki, dubbed the 'bin-Laden of the Internet,' has been using YouTube to promote his extremist ideology and recruit a new generation of terrorists

[…]

I am asking that you remove all videos featuring Anwar al-Awlaki from your website and set up safeguards to prevent future videos from being posted.

In a response, sent to CNN, Youtube claimed that its policies,

prohibit videos that promote dangerous or illegal activities (including bomb-making, sniper attacks, or other terrorist acts), contain hate speech, and videos that are posted with the purpose of inciting others to commit specific, serious acts of violence. In addition, we remove all videos and terminate any account known to be registered by a member of a designated Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO) and used in an official capacity to further the interests of the FTO. We review all videos brought to our attention through community flagging 7 days a week, and routinely remove content that violates our policies, usually in under an hour.

This is a very carefully worded response; note, for example, the reference to ‘specific’ acts of violence. The vast majority of Awlaki’s audio and video materials do not tell followers to attack specific locations or people, rather they are designed to deliver the Salafi-jihadist ideology in a way so as to appeal to westerners, and in particular, English speakers.

Fundamentally, this comes down to two main issues: online censorship and what level of responsibility Youtube and other similar social network sites have towards ensuring that extremist messages are not disseminated through their systems. On the former, this is still very much unresolved and what should and should not be censored online is a matter for legislators – the problem is the speed at which the internet community moves and changes is, as yet, too fast for sluggish government bureaucracies to react to. The latter is more of a question of ethics and corporate responsibility; if certain material is on the edge of legality, but not clearly incitement to murder or violence, and comes from the mouth of a known extremist, should they take it upon themselves to censor it? I’ll leave it to our readers to give their opinions on this.

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The UK National Security Strategy was released yesterday afternoon, and it is in some ways a quite impressive document. Unlike many such reports, this one is a short (39 pages), clear and concise work which includes not only a comprehensive risk assessment, but also details on how government spending should be shaped accordingly.

It has clearly been formulated with unconventional warfare in mind; of the two new air craft carriers being built, for example, only one will be operational at a time and neither will house fighter jets until 2020, when the Joint Strike Fighter will go operational. This is not good news for those who would like to see Britain retain the ability to take part in another overseas conflict such as Afghanistan, and perhaps reflects the government’s view on Britain’s future role in any such action. However, the tier system employed by the report goes some way toward explaining this approach.

Threats to national security have been divided into three “tier levels”. Among the “tier three” threats are conventional military attacks on the British mainland and a Chernobyl style nuclear power plant meltdown. “Tier two” includes a rise in organized crime and the risk of an insurgency or civil war in a failed state creating conditions conducive to terrorists who aim to attack Britain. “Tier one” is, of course, the most significant, and predictably includes the threat of international jihadist terrorism. Rather less expected is the report’s identification of Northern Irish Republican dissidents as a clear and present threat. Considering the recent rise in their activities, 37 attacks this year alone, Republican dissidents are certainly a worthy inclusion – a point which will soon be made in an upcoming ICSR report on Northern Irish militants.

My one criticism of how the threats have been ordered is the inclusion in “tier two” of the ‘risk of major instability, insurgency or civil war overseas which creates an environment that terrorists can exploit to threaten the UK.’ This is a reference to, among other regions, Somalia, which has been identified as a training base for international jihadists seeking to attack Britain and the United States. The immediate terrorist threat to the UK and powerful jihadist insurgencies in the Horn of Africa are inexorably linked, and should not be put in separate categories.

Within the tier one section of the strategy, there are a few quotes worth pulling out. The first refers to a possible shift in strategy from al-Qaeda:

Senior Al Qaeda figures have urged Muslims in the West to conduct attacks without training or direction from established groups. Such lone terrorists are inherently unpredictable and their plots are difficult to detect. Al Qaeda may consider smaller-scale attacks against softer targets which would nonetheless attract considerable media attention.

This is indeed correct, and al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula’s recently released English language magazine, Inspire, directs readers to follow just this sort of lone-wolf, small-scale tactic. The head of Mi5, Jonathan Evans, also noted recently that al-Qaeda’s Anwar al-Awlaki ‘encourages his followers to think about mounting small-scale attacks that can cause widespread fear without always trying to stage a September 11-style "spectacular" which risks alerting the authorities.’

The strategy also makes reference to the problem of online radicalisation, another topic on which ICSR has produced an authoritative report on, and continues to research:

Terrorists use cyberspace to organise, communicate and influence those vulnerable to radicalisation.

This is beyond any doubt, and Interpol also publically recognised this recently when its, Ronald K. Noble, said:

The advent of the Internet has made the process of radicalization easier to achieve and the process of combating it that much more difficult, because many of the behaviors associated with it are not in and of themselves criminal...

The threat is global; it is virtual; and it is on our doorstep.

One final quote that could be worth following up refers to the prevention of terrorism:

Although we have had success in disrupting the great majority of planned attacks in the UK, international terrorism can affect British interests at home or overseas. It is easier to disrupt terrorist capability than to remove terrorists’ underlying motivation, but we must still work to stop people from becoming terrorists in the first place.

Again, this is a very good point, and something the British state has tried, and so far failed, to achieve through the Prevent strategy that was recently scrapped by the Department of Communities and Local Government. Part of the CONTEST counter-terrorism strategy, Prevent was formed to do precisely what this strategy recommends and stop terrorism at its root, but it was scrapped in July by the Department of Communities and Local Government, the official body tasked with administering the programme. How this will now be pursued is still unclear, and we shall await more details from the government.

NOTE:

ICSR Co-Director, Dr John Bew, appeared on BBC Newsnight to discuss the strategy, the report can be viewed here.

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