Iraqi Elections: The Good, the Bad, and the Absent
Iraq's March 7 Parliamentary Elections seem to have crept up on the mainstream British press relatively unawares, certainly by comparison to the fanfare accompanying the 2005 elections. If the Arab press has remained rather more attentive to Iraq's democracy experiment, then one aspect that in general seems to have been glaringly absent from critical discussion is the matter of post-electoral economic agendas. More to the point; this aspect appears to have been largely absent from the contending coalitions' own manifestos.
A week on from the elections, preliminary results suggest that things are panning out pretty much as predicted in pre-electoral opinion polls conducted by Iraq’s National Media Centre. The Rule of Law Coalition of outgoing Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki leads in seven of eighteen provinces; the Iraqiyya bloc headed by former Prime Minister Ayad Allawi leads in four; the Iraqi National Alliance combining Sadrists and the ISCI is ahead in three southern provinces, whilst the Kurdish Alliance holds sway in the three northern Kurdish provinces.
Results for the disputed Kirkuk province hang in the balance with al-Iraqiyya and the Kurdish Alliance fighting it out. Despite widespread finger-pointing for suspected ballot box rigging and accusations made by some contenders against the Independent High Electoral Commission (IHEC) for its partiality towards the Shi’a, these results are not hugely contentious. However, nor are they particularly revealing or decisive of what is to come. Whichever Coalition emerges ahead, it will not be governing single-handedly.
The real nature of Iraq's future government will be decided over the coming months by a painstaking process of building fragile political alliances… and if the experience of Iraqi politics over the past 7 years has taught us anything, it is that some very surprising alliances may emerge.
This latest round of elections has brought to light positive and negative developments. On the upside, a 62% registered voter turnout despite a series of bombing attacks throughout the country during the campaign does credit to the electorate's optimism in the political system, and in contrast to 2005, this time the Sunni population have participated en masse.
A further breakthrough in the proportional representation electoral system was the imposition of an open list of candidates, enabling voters to choose precisely whom they elect, and forcing candidates to individually pursue popular support. This measure, heavily influenced by popular demand, should ensure that some of the less savoury characters in Iraqi politics are not re-elected.
On this note, the electoral campaign, following the trend of the 2009 Provincial Elections, has witnessed a dramatic decrease in sectarian rhetoric, and the emergence of more secular or mixed sect alliances. On the downside, the run-up to the elections was marred by boycotts and vetoes concerning the numbers of parliamentary seats and provisions for the election in the oil-rich Kirkuk (a matter remains heavily disputed between Iraqi Arabs and Kurds).
The decision by the Accountability and Justice Commission to ban over 500 candidates on the grounds of their association to the former Ba'ath party just weeks before the elections was seen as an unambiguous attempt to target the secular parties and to derail the smooth-running of the election.
Amidst all of these considerations, however, it strikes me that what has been surprisingly absent has been any serious campaigning by any of the leading Coalitions on the basis of serious economic reform. And this is worrying not only because it suggests that the parties do not have clear plans for how to encourage economic growth and to maximise their national budget, but also because it suggests that the Iraqi populace have not made demands on them to do so.
Despite the perception that the 2009 Provincial Elections punished those parties who, through a combination of incompetence and corruption, had failed to provide people with basic services, the political groups do not appear to have taken these lessons on board in terms of economic agendas. True; the Iraqi budget is beset by uncertainties; tied in part to donor contributions; in part to global oil revenues; and in part to the relative control exercised by provincial governorates over internal revenues.
Nonetheless, the party-political formulation of clear economic programmes and priorities is a vital component of functional democracies, and in the context of Iraq, one which is central to averting prolonged vulnerability to extremist tendencies within society.
Since 2003 Coalition Forces in Iraq frequently deliberated over the chicken-and-egg dilemma of what comes first: security or economic opportunity. For the most part, circumstances forced an emphasis on the provision of security, with the focus on reconstruction and moreover long-term economic growth taking a back seat.
But this cannot be the long term way forward. It is not enough for Maliki's party, or any other party, to attract voters via short-term employment incentives; at some stage they must offer daring economic visions for the future. March 7 should have been a good stage for that.
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FREErad!cals is the ICSR blog. It's a forum for debate and fresh ideas on radicalisation and political violence. It features some of the most innovative, young thinkers, discussing radicals and radicalisation. They are looking at how the challenge has been understood, and how it should be addressed.
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