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A recently released high-level report reveals the UK intelligence services' assessment of the threat posed by Islamist terrorists in the form of 'electronic attack', or what are increasingly referred to as 'cyber attacks'.The Intelligence and Security Committee (ISC) is the statutory body with… View the full article +A recently released high-level report reveals the UK intelligence services' assessment of the threat posed by Islamist terrorists in the form of 'electronic attack', or what are increasingly referred to as 'cyber attacks'.
The Intelligence and Security Committee (ISC) is the statutory body with oversight of the Security Service (MI5), Secret Intelligence Service (MI6), and Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ). Since it was set up in 1994, its remit has expanded to include the Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC), and the Intelligence, Security and Resilience Group (ISRG). Every year, it presents a report to the Prime Minister, which also includes the results of its consultations with other bodies, including the Defence Intelligence Staff (DIS). In short, its job is to tell Number 10 how well the UK's intelligence agencies are doing, and what problems exist.
The new report [pdf] was presented to the PM on 16 December last year and was eventually published last week [press release, PDF]. The section of interest to us is on page nine:The Centre for the Protection of National Infrastructure (CPNI) told the Committee:
...
Electronic attack is also used by Islamist terrorists who have the capability to launch limited forms of attack over the internet. Technical capability varies greatly, and it appears that their intentions are the defacement or denial of service of specific websites. These attempts are often ***. There are, however, indications that awareness and use of electronic attack is on the increase and ***.
Note the redacted sections, which I'll leave to you to fill as you see fit. It is clear from this document that CPNI regards the two principal vectors of cyber attack to be foreign intelligence services and Islamists. The report notes that GCHQ agrees, and it created something called the Network Defence Intelligence and Security Team (NDIST) in September 2008, to address this issue. This is a group you won't find on Google, and which I've never heard of. How this will play together with the Cyber Security Operations Centre (CSOC), also at GCHQ , and due to become operational at the end of this month, remains to be seen, particularly as the ISC criticises government for not letting it know sooner about the CSOC.
For obvious reasons, the report is short on details, but it does give us a glimpse of how the UK's intelligence community views the Islamist threat in the specific area of cyber attacks. It's not talking about propaganda or recruitment, just about attacks on infrastructure and networked assets. To be honest, it's hardly earth-shattering, and government seems to have a handle on it, even if GCHQ complains about a lack of staff and is running at "about a third below the level planned" in this field. I guess we'll have to wait until next year to see how things change with respect to this particular confrontation in cyberspace.
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I'd planned to be focusing on final preparations for an upcoming field research trip to Lebanon and Algeria. But then Pakistan went and arrested half the Quetta Shura. The full consequences won't become clear for a while, and a number of questions now loom.There's obviously the issue of the degree… View the full article +I'd planned to be focusing on final preparations for an upcoming field research trip to Lebanon and Algeria. But then Pakistan went and arrested half the Quetta Shura. The full consequences won't become clear for a while, and a number of questions now loom.
There's obviously the issue of the degree to which this will impair the Taliban operationally. As well as the question of how this move will affect the Taliban's relationship with al-Qaeda on the one hand and Pakistan on the other. The biggest question, for me at least, is what this says about Pakistan's calculus. On the optimistic end one could hope this marks a critical break with Pakistan's past protection of the Afghan Taliban? Or for cynics out there was this a play to remove some of those actors who might have sought a separate peace that excluded Pakistan from the equation?
The Christian Science Monitor, which broke the story, carries a couple of quotes that point toward the latter:The crackdown may to be related to efforts by some Taliban leaders to explore talks with Western and Afghan authorities independently of Pakistan, the UN official said. Pakistan is widely suspected of backing the Afghan Taliban in a bid to maintain influence in Afghanistan, a charge Islamabad has long denied. But Pakistan may also be wary of Taliban attempts to initiate talks without its involvement or sanction.
"Pakistan wants a seat at the table," says the UN official, who is familiar with Taliban efforts to initiate talks. "They don't want the Taliban to act independently."
"It's possible that Mullah Baradar and those around him wanted to start thinking about an eventual settlement," says Mr. Muzjda. Former and current Taliban figures emphasize, however, that such a settlement necessarily involves a timetable for withdrawal of foreign forces in the country.
Perhaps. Or maybe Pakistan concluded that the best way to guarantee a seat at the table was to show the U.S. that it deserved one.
On an unrelated matter, I'm not in the practice of linking to different articles that carry an odd quote of mine. But a week ago I gave an interview to the Hindustan Times about LeT's recent activities and what I said ended up differing from what made it into print. I'm going to chalk this up to a crappy phone connection, but nonetheless some important nuances were lost and I wanted to take this opportunity to set the record straight. I appreciate this blog’s readership indulging me.
The crux of the story, which you can read here, was about Lashkar's resurgence especially in light of the recent Pune attack. In it, the reporter quoted me as saying:Lashkar resurgent spells India bloodied. While Lashkar has shown pan-Islamic tendencies, says Stephen Tankel, author of Storming the World Stage: The Story of Lashkar e Taiba, "for the core leadership, India remains the main enemy." Another fillip for Lashkar, he says, is that despite Mumbai its infrastructure has been unharmed and it's incurred no costs.
I did not say its infrastructure was unharmed and it incurred no costs as a result of the 2008 Mumbai attacks. I said its social welfare operations were restricted, but continued to operate. I also added there was nominal government control over some facets of the organization, but by no means all of it. Further, the government did take JuD [its social welfare wing] out of the formal banking system. While I did say its military infrastructure emerged relatively unscathed, I emphasized I was referring to the military infrastructure and not the overall infrastructure. An important distinction given the restrictions, however minimal they may be, placed on JuD. Overall, I said, the group incurred minimal costs in proportion to the benefits it accrued from the Mumbai attacks.
"Unharmed" and "no costs" are absolutist statements. They give the impression that Pakistan did absolutely nothing, which is not true. I'll be the first to hammer the Pakistanis for not doing nearly enough – and have a number of times – but it's incorrect to suggest they did nothing at all.
Regarding the questionable claim of responsibility by a LeT splinter, the reporter also quoted me as saying "I've never heard any rumblings about Lashkar splinters." Not what I said. I can name at least one LeT splinter, not to mention the temporary split in the organization in 2004. What I said was that I’d not heard any rumblings about a new splinter organization having emerged.
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Earlier this week, the United Nations met with private sector representatives at Microsoft’s Redmond HQ, to discuss how to tackle the use of the internet for terrorist purposes. This is from the UN press release:The Working Group on Countering the Use of the Internet for Terrorist… View the full article +Earlier this week, the United Nations met with private sector representatives at Microsoft’s Redmond HQ, to discuss how to tackle the use of the internet for terrorist purposes. This is from the UN press release:
The Working Group on Countering the Use of the Internet for Terrorist Purposes – part of the UN Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force (CTITF) – is holding talks at Microsoft’s headquarters, near the United States city of Seattle, with the company and others, including Symantec and McAfee, to examine technical issues surrounding the topic.
The two-day gathering which started today is the first of its kind at the UN level to bring together Member States and entities of the world body with the private sector and academia to examine ways to counter terrorist use of the Internet.
There is a high level of crime on the Internet, and “it is essential that you bring in the private sector, [which is] an essential partner in moving forward,” Richard Barrett, who co-chairs the Working Group, told the UN News Centre.
This reliance on private-public partnerships is certainly where things are moving in cybersecurity generally. It is recognition that governments do not have the necessary skills and capabilities in-house to tackle issues that in part derive from and also affect the global communications infrastructures that are, after all, largely under corporate control.
It will be interesting to see what the Working Group proposes as a result of this ongoing consultation process. The melding of commercial, political, media and security networks is an inherently tricky and risky business and the UN will have to address up front how to preserve the integrity and safeguards afforded to ‘normal’ users of the internet. It is no simple task just to get everyone talking, and for progressive proposals to emerge from that process. As the press release recognises of just one particular issue:Member States have yet to agree on a precise definition of “terrorism.” This complicates discussions on possible legal frameworks to prevent or curtail terrorists’ use of the Internet due to the resulting questions over possible infringements on the freedom of speech and human rights, Mr. Barrett noted.
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Over at the Inner London Crown Court the case is being heard against Cossor Ali, the wife of Abdullah Ahmed Ali, one of the leaders of the UK end of the plot disrupted in August 2006, alternatively known by its police codename "Overt" or as the "liquid plot" after the main bomb… View the full article +
Over at the Inner London Crown Court the case is being heard against Cossor Ali, the wife of Abdullah Ahmed Ali, one of the leaders of the UK end of the plot disrupted in August 2006, alternatively known by its police codename "Overt" or as the "liquid plot" after the main bomb ingredient (and the reason for the subsequent restrictions on liquids on airplanes). Cossor Ali stands accused of being complicit in the plot by knowing about it prior to its occurrence and failing to alert the authorities.
The outcome of the case is unclear at this point, and at the moment one of the newer pieces of information to emerge is that Abdullah Ali was something of an absent and abusive husband – or at the very least domineering. Cossor Ali has claimed she felt her personality was being erased when she was absorbed into her husband's family and that he was away for the birth of their child.The evidence for the prosecution appears to hinge around statements recorded in Cossor Ali's diary about extremist literature she read and the fact that she appeared to support the activities her husband was undertaking. She hoped he might become a "shahada" (a "martyr", though the defence contends this means "the highest form of spirituality"). Her fingerprints were also found on some radical material at their home.
She is not the first wife in the UK to be brought up on charges of either knowing or being complicit in their husband's activities. Mehreen Haji, wife of convicted Al Qaeda member Habib Ahmed, was cleared of arranging terrorist funding.Tahira Tabassum, wife of attempted Tel Aviv bomber Omar Khan Sharif, was cleared of knowing what her husband was plotting. Bouchra el-Hor was tried and cleared, while her husband Yassin Nassari, was convicted on charges of possessing extremist material.
Mohammed Siddique Khan's wife was picked up in a wave of arrests that followed the long investigation into the July 7, 2005 bombings, but was later released without facing any charges. On the other side of the coin, Yeshiembert Girma, the wife of Hussain Osman one of the failed July 21 bombers, was convicted of helping orchestrate Osman's escape and of knowing about the plot prior to the event.
Fellow failed bomber Yassin Omar's 17-year old recent fiancée Fardosa Abdullahi pled guilty to charges of facilitating his escape. Beyond British shores, there is of course the story of Muriel Degauque, the Belgian convert who blew herself up in Iraq soon after her husband had attempted a similar attack.
In other instances, there are stories of couples that meet while involved in radical groups (or join them together), a phenomenon that is maybe less surprising when one considers the time commitment and passion that is required when one joins such groups.
The underlying question, however, is the role, if any, of wives in terrorist plots? In Saudi Arabia, wives (or future spouses) are an integral part of the de-radicalization process, supposedly acting as stabilizers to men who have strayed.While in Belgium Malika el Aroud, the wife of one of Ahmed Shah Masood’s assassins who later remarried a different plotter, is alleged to be a key figure in a radicalizing network. The point is that it would appear as though wives can play both a positive and negative role – and this is not to pry into the broader role of women in radicalizing networks more generally.
A recent story in the Telegraph suggested that security services believe a team of women had been dispatched by Al Qaeda to attack the West, while the BBC highlighted the phenomenon of female recruitment into extremist groups.
What remains somewhat unexplored (to my knowledge – any pointers to interesting reports greatly appreciated) is the role that women have played in terrorist plots – are they accelerators in their husbands radicalization (or possible plotters)? Or are they innocent naïf's who either get caught up in their husband's plotting or are firmly kept out of the loop by domineering males?Or is none of this the case, and in fact they could play a positive role in shifting the husband’s attention from his extreme ideas? All of which would be useful knowledge when attempting to craft a counter- or de-radicalization strategy.
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Fred Burton is a good friend and author of the bestseller memoir, Ghost: Confessions of a Counterterrorism Agent. Fred is a former State Department counter terrorism Special Agent and one of the world's foremost experts on security and terrorist organizations. In this clip he is talking about the… View the full article +
Fred Burton is a good friend and author of the bestseller memoir, Ghost: Confessions of a Counterterrorism Agent. Fred is a former State Department counter terrorism Special Agent and one of the world's foremost experts on security and terrorist organizations.
In this clip he is talking about the assassination, in a Dubai hotel, of Mahmoud al-Mabhough, a top Hamas commander.
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I am taking a break from my series on Countering Violent Extremism (parts one, two, three, four, and five). I’ll get back to that next week. Perhaps the most flawed area of study when it comes to modern Islamist terrorism is Islamist ideology. Nowhere is this more obvious than the literature… View the full article +I am taking a break from my series on Countering Violent Extremism (parts one, two, three, four, and five). I’ll get back to that next week.
Perhaps the most flawed area of study when it comes to modern Islamist terrorism is Islamist ideology. Nowhere is this more obvious than the literature and discourse on al-Qaeda’s understanding of jihad. It seems that everywhere I look, I see people claiming al-Qaeda’s jihad is not offensive; rather, it is defensive. Time to bring some clarity to the issue (see my post on this from August).
Perhaps not surprisingly, this is where many academics get it wrong and practitioners get it right. I once attended a lecture where a respected academic provided an overview of al-Qaeda’s ideology for his audience, explaining that they believed in defensive – not offensive – jihad. I thought he had misspoken and raised my hand for a clarification, asking him if he said al-Qaeda sought to wage a defensive jihad rather than an offensive one. He confirmed his words as such and then pre-emptively berated us, waving a copy of a volume of Osama Bin Laden’s messages to the world, ‘To understand al-Qaeda, you simply must read what they say and write!’
My immediate thought was: ‘I couldn’t agree more, but have you done this?’
Then just today I was reading an otherwise excellent and thought-provoking article in the recent issue of Studies in Conflict & Terrorism by Alia Brahimi of LSE, ‘Crushed in the Shadows: Why Al Qaeda Will Lose the War of Ideas.’
Dr. Brahimi explains al-Qaeda’s jihad is defensive, citing statements by Bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri where they explain they are fighting America because America is attacking the Muslims. In the words of Zawahiri right after the 2004 US presidential election, ‘We only care about purifying our country of the aggressors and resisting anyone who attacks us.’
(This raises the question of how al-Qaeda defines an aggressor and being attacked, but I don’t have the room to address this here. Luckily, Brahimi does briefly address that in her paper, so read it).
Indeed, in a 1997 interview with Peter Arnett, Bin Laden calls his jihad ‘defensive’ and explains it is meant to drive U.S. forces from the Arabian Peninsula and ‘desist from aggressive intervention against Muslims throughout the whole world.’
The volume that prints that interview (and that the academic waved in our faces), Bruce Lawrence’s Messages to the World, explains in a footnote: ‘Bin Laden always describes his jihad as “defensive.”’
So am I wrong?
Herein lays the root of confusion. Bin Laden, Zawahiri, and other AQ leaders certainly do frame their jihad in defensive terms in many of their public communiqués, but these ‘messages to the world’ must be understood in the context of their purpose. They are propaganda pieces. In this sense, I am not entirely fair to Brahimi as she writes Bin Laden ‘presents’ his jihad as defensive – and true, he often does present it that way when messaging to certain audiences. But a clarification must be made.
Let’s take Bin Laden’s statement before the 2004 presidential election, for example. It has widely been observed that the content and timing of the release was meant to influence the American voting public. In words similar to Zawahiri, he said:Your security is not in the hands of Kerry or Bush or al Qaeda. Your security is in your own hands. Any nation that does not attack us will not be attacked.
Rather than viewing this as an expression of ideology, Bin Laden was ‘framing’ the situation for the American people, painting his terrorist network as a threat only as long as the Americans attack the Muslim world (I previously addressed framing in this post on Fort Hood and Anwar al-Awlaki and will address it again in a post to follow this one). You can argue whether the release was meant to help Kerry or Bush (probably Bush, just b/c the very appearance of Osama at that moment may have made the more hawkish candidate seem like a better protector), but the concept holds.
This is not to say that Al Qaeda is disinterested in driving the ‘Zionist-Crusader forces’ from Muslim lands – they most certainly are – but looking to media interviews or propaganda pieces broadcasted either to the West or the Muslim ‘street’ they seek to mobilize is not the most effective way to understand and take accurate measure of their ideology.
Other sources reveal a more accurate picture. These include the longer ‘think pieces’ and books penned by al-Qaeda targeted at smaller audiences rather than propaganda and ‘influence pieces’ that are designed to ‘frame’ issues for current/potential recruits as well as opponents.
For example, in a letter Bin Laden wrote to Saudi intellectuals in the wake of 9/11 (which you can find in The Al Qaeda Reader), he argued:[O]ur talks with the infidel West and our conflict with them ultimately revolve around one issue – one that demands our total support, with power and determination, with one voice – and it is: Does Islam, or does it not, force people by the power of the sword to submit to its authority corporeally if not spiritually? Yes. There are only three choices in Islam: either willing submission; or payment of the jizya, through physical though not spiritual, submission to the authority of Islam; or the sword – for it is not right to let him [an infidel] live. The matter is summed up for every person alive: Either submit, or live under the suzerainty of Islam, or die.
Bin Laden’s purpose in writing this letter was to refute a letter these intellectuals had written to the U.S. that he saw as ‘full of humility, entreaties, and prostration.’ He condemns their letter for ‘reputiad[ing] Offensive Jihad.’
He insists,Offensive Jihad is an established and basic tenet of this religion. It is a religious duty rejected only by the most deluded. So how can they call off this religious obligation [Offensive Jihad], while imploring the West to understandings and talks ‘under the umbrella of justice, morality, and rights’?
It is fascinating how he condemns the quoted values of the letter he criticizes even though al Qaeda propaganda attempts to appeal to those same values when he ‘explains’ to the West and the Rest why al-Qaeda is at war. Could it be that AQ propaganda might not be an accurate representation of AQ ideology?
Coming up next, ideological justification for offensive jihad from a prominent jihadist ideologue.
In the meantime, your homework: read Milestones by Sayyid Qutb [pdf] and see what he has to say about offensive vs. defensive jihad. If your job is even remotely concerned with Islamist terrorism and you haven’t read this short volume yet, please remedy this immediately.
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I'm retiring …This is to announce that I’m retiring. The reason for that is the translation into Chinese of my A History of Israel and its publication in China. I strongly believe that A History of Israel, which the Chinese titled The History of Israel, by which they… View the full article +
I'm retiring …
This is to announce that I’m retiring. The reason for that is the translation into Chinese of my A History of Israel and its publication in China.
I strongly believe that A History of Israel, which the Chinese titled The History of Israel, by which they probably mean that this, in their view, is the definitive history of Israel, will sell well in China.
I have just Googled "population of China" and I can tell you that it stands at a number which I can't really read: 1,330,044,605.
I'm not an idiot and I do acknowledge that some Chinese (particularly in small villages) are unlikely to buy my book. But even if, say, 10 per cent of the total Chinese population does purchase this masterpiece, at its current paperback price of 35 Yuan 元 (which is £3.15), then I’m still financially safe and can afford an early retirement.
My readers and admirers are asked to please email me their thoughts on the follwing: 1. destinations to which I could retire. 2. Books I should carry with me should what is proposed above is an isolated place (say, an island); but please no Bible, nor books on the Middle East.
Thank you.
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On Tuesday Jane Perlez at the NYT reported that Pakistan offered to mediate with Taliban factions who use its territory and have long served as its allies. This is not the first time that Pakistan floated such an idea. In July the Army's spokesman Athar Abbas floated the idea during a CNN interview… View the full article +
On Tuesday Jane Perlez at the NYT reported that Pakistan offered to mediate with Taliban factions who use its territory and have long served as its allies. This is not the first time that Pakistan floated such an idea. In July the Army's spokesman Athar Abbas floated the idea during a CNN interview when he stated Pakistan still had contacts with various Taliban factions and hinted at what wanted [hint: it had something to do with keeping the country to its east out of the country to its west] in exchange for helping to broker a solution. That trial balloon got popped a few hours when the Inter-Services Public Relations denied Abbas ever made the comments.
This time around, the offer came from Gen. Ashfaq Parvez Kayani, the army chief, during a meeting last month at NATO headquarters. Two things jump out from Perlez's reporting. First, this:Pakistani officials familiar with General Kayani's thinking said that even as the United States adds troops to Afghanistan, he has determined that the Americans are looking for a fast exit.
The idea that Pakistan is moving because it thinks the U.S. is working on borrowed time could be read many ways, but two broad notions stand out. One is that America has done a poor job of convincing its allies and its enemies that it is prepared to stay the course and Pakistan is positioning itself to resume some sort of hegemonic relationship vis-à-vis Afghanistan. Maybe not turning the clock back to September 10th, but it has successfully waited the U.S. out and is now poised to deliver an acceptable peace.The other is that Pakistan sees the writing on the wall and realizes that without the U.S. there in the long-term it is going to be forced to deal with a government in Kabul that is much closer to Delhi than it would like. Further, this suggests that Pakistan doubts whether, even without the U.S. there, it could turn the clock back to September 10th and enjoy a proxy government [even one that did not listen to it all that much] in Kabul.
In reality, both of these calculations probably exist simultaneously. Former Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage has claimed the ISI stayed out of Afghanistan more than the U.S. expected for the first 4-5 years of the fight because it assumed the U.S. would triumph. When the Taliban’s insurgency gained legs a few years back, the ISI reengaged. It probably did so out of fear and opportunism. In any event, the question is not just what Pakistan hopes to gain in terms of influence in Afghanistan, but what it can deliver for the U.S. and whether that aligns with American goals for the region.
This goes to the second item that jumped out at me:What the Pakistanis can offer is their influence over the Taliban network of Jalaluddin and Siraj Haqqani, whose forces American commanders say are the most lethal battling American and NATO soldiers in Afghanistan.
The Haqqani network is responsible for much of the violence in southern Afghanistan and the major suicide bombing operations in the country. The Haqqani's are close to al-Qaeda's leadership – a relationship that goes back to the war against the Soviets – and have acted as a proxy for Pakistan in Afghanistan. It was responsible for planning the suicide bombing operation against the Indian embassy in Kabul in July 2008, which U.S. officials claim the ISI engineered. It also helped AQ and the TTP to stage the 30 December attack on a CIA base in Afghanistan. The million dollar question is, therefore, which way would the Haqqani's swing?
My evolving sense of the ISI vis-à-vis control over proxies like these is that it has a lot more contact and influence than it claims publicly and a less influence than it claims privately. Could Pakistan get the Haqqani network to ratchet back in Afghanistan? Maybe. But could it get the Haqqani's to deliver their AQ allies? I'm pretty skeptical. And while stability in Afghanistan would be great, the idea was always to degrade al-Qaeda. Perlez reports:According to a Pakistani military official, the Pakistanis would first have to resolve where Qaeda fighters would go and whether they might be given safe passage to Yemen or another location.
This seems a bit far-fetched to me and I can't imagine the U.S. agreeing to it. Of greater concern is that, if the U.S. does pull back from an Afghanistan where Pakistan has greater influence without rolling up al-Qaeda elements in the tribal areas then it is going to be much more difficult to keep the pressure on. Again, stabilizing Afghanistan would be wonderful and taking players like the Haqqanis off the pitch would go a long way toward doing that.But fighting in Afghanistan was always supposed to be a means to the end of al-Qaeda elements in the region. On that score, Dan Markey who knows a thing or two about Pakistan summed it up pretty well when he told Perlez 'The United States side is pretty worried about seeing a deal emerge that suits everyone other than us.'
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In response to Amm Samm's last post, "visitor" raised a number of interesting points, one of which I wanted to use the opportunity to quickly highlight.Amm Samm: "there are no clear metrics for measuring success"Visitor: "what do you offer?"This is something that I… View the full article +
In response to Amm Samm's last post, "visitor" raised a number of interesting points, one of which I wanted to use the opportunity to quickly highlight.
Amm Samm: "there are no clear metrics for measuring success"
Visitor: "what do you offer?"
This is something that I have to admit that I have also been guilty of, complaining about the absence of metrics of PREVENT without necessarily offering any solutions. Consequently, I will use this opportunity to sketch out some thoughts I have been recently having on the topic (Amm has some coming up too I believe).
On the one hand, it should be quite easy to measure success: no terrorism attacks means the strategy is "preventing" terrorism. But how do we know whether what we are spending public money is actually having an impact and it is not other factors? This is important if we do not simply want to be throwing money away.
One solution that has been offered is to calculate the amount of good that groups receiving Prevent funding are able to do in their community: are they helping kids, providing useful local social functions, etc.
A police view that I have instead heard is that success in Prevent is measured by the amount the community trusts and engages with them – are communities coming forwards to offer information on people unsolicited? Are traditionally more sceptical communities using local social services, and thus "trusting" the system and becoming more engaged and less alienated?
But while both of these sound like reasonable areas to use as a basis to measure success, it remains hard to know exactly how many terrorists have been "prevented" in each case for each pound spent. Also, it seems awfully unclear to me that either of these metrics is somehow evidence that the government's strategy is in fact shielding us from the few individuals within society who choose to get involved in terrorism.
Without wanting to sound like I am throwing the baby out with the bathwater, maybe the root of the problem is that the scope we have defined for PREVENT is simply too large, and thus this is why we cannot find suitable metrics: maybe if we pared PREVENT down to simply being activity which pre-empts terrorist activity before it reaches the PURSUE stage then we might be able to measure success it in better.
As I have said before, this does not mean stopping work being done under PREVENT, simply de-tagging it from security. Instead, let us have PREVENT be more intelligence based activity or strengthened (and targeted) social work, alongside efforts to actively counter the spread of radical ideas and breaking up groups actively recruiting people to go abroad to fight. While it will remain hard to calculate success (we are still after all talking about measuring something by its absence), it will theoretically be more tangible than the slightly abstract societal measures that are currently offered by NI 35.
I look forward to hopefully having a conversation with people on this either in the comments or via email if you would prefer. -
Last week, the UK government quietly announced that a new unit in Whitehall would begin sifting through complaints from the public about 'hate, extremism and terrorism online'. In what seems to be the result of four years of civil service head-scratching about how to design a delivery mechanism for… View the full article +Last week, the UK government quietly announced that a new unit in Whitehall would begin sifting through complaints from the public about 'hate, extremism and terrorism online'. In what seems to be the result of four years of civil service head-scratching about how to design a delivery mechanism for the Section 3("notice-and-takedown", NTD) provisions of the Terrorism Act 2006, the result is probably the most benign mechanism Whitehall could come up with to assuage pressure groups (both internal and external) whilst saving political face.
Under the new initiative, the government is enlisting the help of the internet-using public to find and report on various types of content and behaviour deemed illegal under the provisions of the Terrorism Acts of 2000 and 2006. To its credit the Home Office states, “most hateful or violent website content is not illegal. While you may come across a lot of things on the internet that offend you, very little of it is actually illegal.” That’s an important message, although I guess it will be some time before we know if it sufficiently discourages axe-grinders from submitting various types of legal content to the new Counter Terrorism Internet Referral Unit.
There may be some utility to this measure. It signals that certain types of material that fall foul of counterterrorism legislation will not be tolerated in the UK. As such, it will bolster government's promotion of its 'values' in this area, as well as contributing in some small way to making "the internet a more hostile environment for terrorists and violent extremists who seek to exploit modern technology", as the press release claims. However, as a genuine bulwark against violent extremism it is a non-starter and will certainly fail to deliver on government's stated objectives of reducing radicalisation and countering violent extremism online. For a start, even if such a scheme―assuming it can maintain any kind of visibility, which is unlikely―succeeded in driving all illegal internet material currently served by UK persons and companies to foreign locations, this content would still be accessible to those who look for it.
This criticism relates to a mere practicality but there is a more important issue. This looks very like policy retrospectively trying to justify poor legislation. Recall that the Section 3 provisions of the Terrorism Act 2006 have never been used, partly because the police―who are charged with serving NTDs―have consistently backed away from being the ones to adjudicate on what might be lawful or not in contentious areas like the 'glorification of terrorism'. Rather than just accept that if they were really serious about prosecuting UK citizens and companies for hosting certain types of material that breach any number of much older established statutes regarding incitement, racial hatred, etc, this government persists in attempting to justify badly drafted legislation under the rubric of counterterrorism policy.
Why a specific reporting mechanism for terrorism? We have one for child abuse, surely a near-universal taboo, but we don’t bother for much else. Why not any other crimes? If it's deeply-held cultural convictions and social norms that the government is trying to uphold, why resort to highly contentious legislation borne of fear and panic, rather than existing legislation that, quite apart from having been successfully tested many times in the courts, directly reflects those norms and values upon which British society claims to be based, pre-9/11?
This government, in common with most others, has yet to make a firm case demonstrating even the weakest causal relationship between internet 'content', 'radicalisation', and 'violent extremism'. Sure, it crops up in the biographies of many terrorists as a behavioural indicator, but many other things do too. This is not a disingenuous statement, and it should not be up to academics, civil servants and rights activists to refute the case for regulation of expression. Rather, it is up to government to make the case for it, and it has yet to do so.
So much for evidence-based policy. In 2002, in a speech to the Economic and Social Research Council, then Home Secretary David Blunkett said, "this government has given a clear commitment that we will be guided not by dogma but by an open-minded approach to understanding what works and why." Unless this government is sitting on a body of data that has thus far eluded the world’s academic community, I suggest that even a small thing like the new internet referral unit shows how hollow this claim sounds now. On its own, this initiative is unlikely to do much damage―nor achieve much of anything, to be frank―but one has to wonder at the institutional processes that more-or-less demanded something like it, for better or for worse.
Introduction
FREErad!cals is the ICSR blog. It's a forum for debate and fresh ideas on radicalisation and political violence. It features some of the most innovative, young thinkers, discussing radicals and radicalisation. They are looking at how the challenge has been understood, and how it should be addressed.
Contributors
Guest Contributors
Recommended Reading
-
General
- The Long War Journal
- Global Terrorism Analysis Jamestown Foundation
- MICROCON: A Micro Level Analysis of Violent Conflict
- University of Maryland, START Center
- Terrorism and Homeland Security RAND
- Terrorism Answers Council on Foreign Relations
- Institute for War & Peace Reporting
- The Jamestown Foundation
- Radio Free Europe Radio Liberty
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Blogs
- Jihadica
- The Cable
- Abu Muqawama
- Danger Room - Whats Next in International Security
- Jarret.Brachman.Phd
- Small Wars Journal Blog
- Kings of War
- Counterterrorism Blog
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Regional
- Ghosts of Alexander
- Registan
- The Pakistan Policy Blog
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Online Radicalisation
- Cyber Law Blog
- Ubiwar
- MetaSecurity Security of Virtual Worlds
- Berkman Center for Internet and Society at Harvard University
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Posted by Tim Stevens on 15/03/10